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Abstract
Global climate change and fuel security risks have encouraged international and regional adoption of pollution/carbon
taxes. A major portion of such policy interventions is directed at the electric power industry with taxes applied according to
the type of fuel used by the power generators in their power plants. This paper proposes an electric power supply chain
network model that captures the behavior of power generators faced with a portfolio of power plant options and subject
to pollution taxes. We demonstrate that this general model can be reformulated as a transportation network equilibrium
model with elastic demands and qualitatively analyzed and solved as such. The connections between these two different
modeling schemas is done through finite-dimensional variational inequality theory. The numerical examples illustrate
how changes in the pollution/carbon taxes affect the equilibrium electric power supply chain network production outputs,
the transactions between the various decision-makers the demand market prices, as well as the total amount of carbon
emissions generated.
 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The ubiquity of electricity in the industrialized world obscures the scale, impacts, and ongoing economic
transformation of this vital sector. In modern societies there are few goods or services that do not depend
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directly on electricity. In the past half-century, the total annual electricity use in the US alone has grown every
year but two. Other statistics of scale include the US electrical industry’s more than half a trillion dollars of net
assets, its $220 billion in annual sales, and its consumption of almost 40% of domestic primary energy (coal,
natural gas, uranium, and oil), or approximately 40 quadrillion BTU (see Edison Electric Institute, 2000;
Energy Information Administration, 2000, 2005). In addition to the great economic and industrial impacts
of electric power, the heavy reliance on fossil fuel sources before conversion to electricity has had concomi-
tantly a large environmental impact. Of the total US emissions of carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, more than
a third arises from generating electricity. With the accumulating evidence of global warming, any policy aimed
at mitigating the immense risks of unstable climate must directly address the electricity industry (Poterba,
1993; Cline, 1992).
Currently, market prices for energy fail to signal its many external costs (e.g., regional and global pollution)
and also hide market distortions such as subsidies. In order to address such market failures in energy, a pow-
erful policy is that of pollution taxes, specifically, carbon taxes (Baranzini et al., 2000), and encouraging gen-
eration from renewable sources (e.g., solar power and wind power, Painuly, 2001) through the use of credits
(e.g., tradable green certificates). The latter policy instrument is now deployed in several states in the US, as
well as in the European Union (see RECS, 1999; Schaeffer et al., 1999).
Hence, the modeling of the options available to power generators in terms of their power plant selection
(and associated fuel) plus environmental taxes is of great interest in the electric power industry. A suitable
model, however, must also be able to accommodate changing economic behavior due to the deregulation
of the electric power industry, from the historic norm of highly regulated, vertically integrated utilities to a
new environment of competition between the major players, such as power generators, suppliers, transmission
service providers, and consumers. For additional background on the electric power industry (see Casazza and
Delea, 2003; Singh, 1999; Zaccour, 1998).
2. The electric power supply chain network model with power plants and pollution taxes
In this section we develop the electric power supply chain network model that includes power plants as well
as pollution taxes. We consider G power generators (or gencos), each of which generally owns and operatesM
power plants. Each power plant may use a different primary energy fuel (i.e., coal, natural gas, uranium, oil,
sun, wind, etc.) and we can expect that each may have different associated costs. Furthermore, as we shall illu-
minate, subsequently, each plant will have associated costs that fully reflect policy objectives. For example, a
coal plant and a natural gas plant, even if they have identical functions for electric power production may have
very different carbon or pollution taxes, as is expected, given their markedly different environmental impacts
(burning coal being far dirtier environmentally than burning natural gas). There are also S power suppliers, T
transmission service providers, and K consumer markets, as depicted in Fig. 1. The majority of the needed
notation is given in Table 1. An equilibrium solution is denoted by ‘‘*’’. All vectors are assumed to be column
vectors, except where noted otherwise.
The top tiered nodes in the electric power supply chain network in Fig. 1, enumerated by 1, . . . , g . . . , G,
represent the G electric power generators, who are the decision-makers who own and operate the electric
power generating facilities or power plants denoted by the second tier of nodes in the network. The gencos
produce electric power using the different power plants and sell to the power suppliers in the third tier. Node
gm in the second tier corresponds to genco g’s power plant m, with the second tier of nodes enumerated as:
11, . . . , GM. We assume that each electric power generator seeks to determine his optimal production portfo-
lio across his power plants and his sales allocations of the electric power to the suppliers in order to maximize
his own profit.
Power suppliers, which are represented by the third tiered nodes in Fig. 1, function as intermediaries. The
nodes corresponding to the power suppliers are enumerated as: 1, . . . , s, . . . , S with node s corresponding to
supplier s. They purchase electric power from the power generators and are aware as to the types of power
plants used by the generators. They also sell the electric power to the consumers at the different demand mar-
kets. We assume that the power suppliers compete with one another in a noncooperative manner. However,
the suppliers do not physically possess electric power at any stage of the supplying process; they only hold and
trade the right for the electric power.
The bottom tiered nodes in Fig. 1 represent the demand markets, which can be distinguished from one
another by their geographic locations or the type of associated consumers such as whether they correspond,
for example, to businesses or to households. There are K bottom-tiered nodes with node k corresponding to
demand market k.
Table 1
Notation for the electric power supply chain network model
Notation Definition
qgm Quantity of electricity produced by generator g using power plant m, where g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M
qm G-dimensional vector of electric power generated by the gencos using power plant m with components: g1m, . . . , gGm
q GM-dimensional vector of all the electric power outputs generated by the gencos at the power plants
Q1 GMS-dimensional vector of electric power flows between the power plants of the power generators and the
power suppliers with component gms denoted by qgms
Q2 STK-dimensional vector of power flows between suppliers and demand markets with component stk denoted
by qtsk and denoting the flow between supplier s and demand market k via transmission provider t
d K-dimensional vector of market demands with component k denoted by dk
fgm(qm) Power generating cost function of power generator g using power plant m with marginal power generating cost
with respect to qgm denoted by
ofgm
oqgm
cgms(qgms) Transaction cost incurred by power generator g using power plant m in transacting with power supplier s with
marginal transaction cost denoted by
ocgmsðqgmsÞ
oqgms
sgm Unit tax associated with carbon emissions by genco g using power plant m
egm Amount of carbon emitted by genco g using power plant m per unit of electric power produced
h S-dimensional vector of the power suppliers’ supplies of the electric power with component s denoted
by hs, with hs 
PG
g¼1
PM
m¼1qgms
cs(h)  cs(Q1) Operating cost of power supplier s with marginal operating cost with respect to hs denoted by ocsohs and the marginal
operating cost with respect to qgms denoted by
ocsðQ1Þ
oqgms
ctskðqtskÞ Transaction cost incurred by power supplier s in transacting with demand market k via transmission
provider t with marginal transaction cost with respect to qtsk denoted by
octsk ðqtsk Þ
oqtsk
cˆgms(qgms) Transaction cost incurred by power supplier s in transacting with power generator g for power generated
by plant m with marginal transaction cost denoted by
oc^gmsðqgmsÞ
oqgms
c^tskðQ2Þ Unit transaction cost incurred by consumers at demand market k in transacting with power
supplier s via transmission provider t
q3k(d) Demand market price function at demand market k
Fig. 1. The electric power supply chain network.
A transmission service is necessary for the physical delivery of electric power from the power generators to
the points of consumption. The transmission service providers are the entities who own and operate the elec-
tric power transmission and distribution systems, and distribute electric power from power generators to the
consumption markets. However, since these transmission service providers do not make decisions such as to
where or from whom the electric power will be delivered, they are not explicitly represented by nodes in this
network model. We, instead, as suggested by Nagurney and Matsypura (2004), model them as different
modes of transaction corresponding to the parallel links connecting a given supplier node to a given demand
market node in Fig. 1. Hence, an implicit assumption is that the power suppliers need to cover the direct cost
and decide which transmission service providers should be used and how much electric power should be deliv-
ered. The structure of the network in Fig. 1 guarantees that the conservation of flow equations associated with
the electric power production and distribution are satisfied. The flows on the links joining the genco nodes in
Fig. 1 to the power plant nodes are respectively: q11, . . . , qgm, . . . , qGM; the flows on the links from the power
plant nodes to the supplier nodes are given, respectively, by the components of the vector Q1, whereas the
flows on the links joining the supplier nodes with the demand markets are given by the respective components
of the vector: Q2.
Of course, if a particular genco does not ownM power plants, then the corresponding links (and nodes) can
just be removed from the electric supply chain network in Fig. 1 and the notation reduced accordingly.
We now describe the behavior of the electric power generators, the suppliers, and the consumers at the
demand markets. We then state the equilibrium conditions of the electric power supply chain network and
provide the variational inequality formulation.
2.1. The behavior of the power generators and their optimality conditions
We assume that egm, g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M, denotes the carbon emissions generated per unit of elec-
tric power produced by genco g using its power plant m. Hence, the total amount of carbon emissions asso-
ciated with genco g and power plant m is egmqgm.
Let q1gms denote the unit price charged by power generator g for the transaction with power supplier s for
power produced at plant m. q1gms is an endogenous variable and can be determined once the complete electric
power supply chain network equilibrium model is solved. Since we have assumed that each individual power
generator is a profit-maximizer, the optimization problem of power generator g can be expressed as follows:
Maximize
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
q1gmsqgms 
XM
m¼1
fgmðqmÞ 
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
cgmsðqgmsÞ 
XM
m¼1
sgmegmqgm ð1Þ
subject to:
XS
s¼1
qgms ¼ qgm; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; ð2Þ
qgms P 0; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S. ð3Þ
The first term in the objective function (1) represents the revenue and the next two terms represent the power
generation cost and transaction costs, respectively. The last term in (1) denotes the total payout in pollution
taxes by the genco based on the total carbon pollution emitted. We note that Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003)
assumed that pollution generated associated with producers in a supply chain had a similar structure, although
in that paper no environmental policies in the form of pollution taxes were considered. Conservation of flow
equation (2) states that the amount of power generated at a particular power plant (and corresponding to a
particular genco) is equal to the electric power transacted by the genco from that power plant with all the sup-
pliers and this holds for each of the power plants.
Note that, according to the power generation cost functions fgm(qm), g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M, the cost
depends not only on the specific power plant’s output using the particular plant-type but may also on the out-
puts of the other power generators using the same power plant-type. This is reasonable due to competition for
the resources that are used in the various electric power plant production processes. Of course, this model con-
tains, as a special case, power generating cost functions such that fgm(qgm), g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M, in
which case the power generating cost associated with a power generator and a power plant depends only upon
the output of the generator’s particular power plant. Hence, in this case, the model would assume perfect com-
petition in the input markets. It is important to note that the proposed modeling framework can handle either
imperfect or perfect competition in the input markets.
We assume that the generating cost and the transaction cost functions for each power generator are con-
tinuously differentiable and convex, and that the power generators compete in a noncooperative manner in the
sense of Nash (1950, 1951). The optimality conditions for all power generators simultaneously, under the
above assumptions (Gabay and Moulin, 1980; Bazaraa et al., 1993; Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1989; Nagurney,
1993), coincide with the solution of the following variational inequality: determine ðq;Q1Þ 2K1 satisfying
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
ofgmðqmÞ
oqgm
þ sgmegm
" #
 ½qgm  qgm þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
ocgmsðqgmsÞ
oqgms
 q1gms
" #
 ½qgms  qgms
P 0 8ðq;Q1Þ 2K1; ð4Þ
whereK1  fðq;Q1Þ j ðq;Q1Þ 2 RGMþGMSþ and (2) holdsg.
2.2. The behavior of power suppliers and their optimality conditions
The power suppliers, such as the power marketers, traders, and brokers, in turn, are involved in transac-
tions both with the power generators and with the consumers at demand markets through the transmission
service providers.
Since electric power cannot be stored, it is reasonable to assume that the total amount of electricity sold by
a power supplier is equal to the total electric power that he purchased from the generators and produced via
the different power plants available to the generators. This assumption can be expressed as the following con-
servation of flow equations:
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
qtsk ¼
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
qgms; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S. ð5Þ
Let qt2sk denote the price charged by power supplier s to demand market k via transmission service provider t.
This price is determined endogenously in the model once the entire network equilibrium problem is solved. As
noted above, it is assumed that each power supplier seeks to maximize his own profit. Hence the optimization
problem faced by supplier s may be expressed as follows:
Maximize
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
qt2skq
t
sk  csðQ1Þ 
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
q1gmsqgms 
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
c^gmsðqgmsÞ 
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
ctskðqtskÞ ð6Þ
subject to:
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
qtsk ¼
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
qgms; ð7Þ
qgms P 0; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; ð8Þ
qtsk P 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T . ð9Þ
The first term in (6) denotes the revenue of supplier s; the second term denotes the operating cost of the supplier;
the third termdenotes the payments for the electric power to the various gencos, and the final two terms represent
the various transaction costs. Note that here we have assumed imperfect competition in terms of the handling
cost but, of course, if the handling cost functions cs, s = 1, . . . , S, depend only on the electric power handled
by s (and not also on the power handled by the other suppliers), then the dependence of these functions on Q1
can be simplified accordingly (and this is a special case of themodel). The latter would reflect perfect competition.
We assume that the transaction costs and the operating costs (6) are all continuously differentiable and con-
vex, and that the power suppliers compete in a noncooperative manner. Hence, the optimality conditions for
all suppliers, simultaneously, under the above assumptions (Dafermos and Nagurney, 1987; Nagurney et al.,
2002; Nagurney and Matsypura, 2004), can be expressed as the following variational inequality: determine
ðQ2;Q1Þ 2K2 such that
XS
s¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
octskðqtskÞ
oqtsk
 qt2sk
 
 ½qtsk  qtsk þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
ocsðQ1Þ
oqgms
þ oc^gmsðq

gmsÞ
oqgms
þ q1gms
" #
 ½qgms  qgmsP 0 8ðQ2;Q1Þ 2K2; ð10Þ
where K2  fðQ2;Q1Þ j ðQ2;Q1Þ 2 RSTKþGMSþ and holdsg.
In addition, for notational convenience, we let
hs 
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
qgms; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S. ð11Þ
As defined in Table 1, the operating cost of power supplier s, cs, is a function of the total electricity inflows
to the power supplier, that is:
csðhÞ  csðQ1Þ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S. ð12Þ
Hence, his marginal cost with respect to hs is equal to the marginal cost with respect to qgms:
ocsðhÞ
ohs
 ocsðQ
1Þ
oqgms
; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M . ð13Þ
After the substitution of (11) and (13) into (10), and algebraic simplification, we obtain a variational
inequality equivalent to (10), as follows: determine ðh;Q2;Q1Þ 2K3 such that
XS
s¼1
ocsðhÞ
ohs
 ½hs  hs  þ
XS
s¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
octskðqtskÞ
oqtsk
 qt2sk
 
 ½qtsk  qtsk þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
oc^gmsðqgmsÞ
oqgms
þ q1gms
" #
 ½qgms  qgmsP 0 8ðh;Q1;Q2; Þ 2K3; ð14Þ
where K3  fðh;Q2;Q1Þ j ðh;Q2;Q1Þ 2 RSð1þTKþGMÞþ and (7) and (11) holdg.
2.3. Equilibrium conditions for the demand markets
At each demand market k the following conservation of flow equation must be satisfied:
dk ¼
XS
s¼1
XT
t¼1
qtsk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K. ð15Þ
Since the demand market price functions are given (instead of the demand functions as was the case in Nagur-
ney and Matsypura, 2004), the market equilibrium conditions at demand market k take the form: for each
power supplier s, s = 1, . . . , S, and transaction mode t, t = 1, . . . , T,
qt2sk þ c^tskðQ2Þ
¼ q3kðdÞ if qtsk > 0;
P q3kðdÞ if qtsk ¼ 0.

ð16Þ
The interpretation of conditions (16) is as follows: consumers at a demand market will purchase power
from a supplier via a transmission provider, provided that the purchase price plus the unit transaction cost
is equal to the price that the consumers are willing to pay at that demand market. If the purchase price plus
the unit transaction cost exceeds the price the consumers are willing to pay, then there will be no transaction
between that supplier and demand market via that transmission provider. The equivalent variational inequal-
ity takes the form: determine ðQ2; dÞ 2K4, such that
XS
s¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
½qt2sk þ c^tskðQ2Þ  ½qtsk  qtsk 
XK
k¼1
q3kðdÞ  ½dk  dk P 0 8ðQ2; dÞ 2K4; ð17Þ
where K4  fðQ2; dÞ j ðQ2; dÞ 2 RKðSTþ1Þþ and (15) holds}.
2.4. The equilibrium conditions for the electric power supply chain network
In equilibrium, the optimality conditions for all the power generators, the optimality conditions for all the
power suppliers, and the equilibrium conditions for all the demand markets must be simultaneously satisfied
so that no decision-maker has any incentive to alter his transactions. We now formally state the equilibrium
conditions for the entire electric power supply chain network.
Definition 1 (Electric power supply chain network equilibrium). The equilibrium state of the electric power
supply chain network with power plants and pollution taxes is one where the electric power flows between the
tiers of the network coincide and the electric power flows satisfy the sum of conditions (4), (14), and (17).
We now state and prove:
Theorem 1 (Variational inequality formulation of the electric power supply chain network equilibrium). The
equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network according to Definition 1 coincide with
the solution of the variational inequality given by: determine ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2K5 satisfying:
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
ofgmðqmÞ
oqgm
þ sgmegm
" #
 ½qgm  qgm þ
XS
s¼1
ocsðhÞ
ohs
 ½hs  hs  þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
ocgmsðqgmsÞ
oqgms
þ oc^gmsðq

gmsÞ
oqgms
" #
 ½qgms  qgms þ
XS
s¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
octskðqtskÞ
oqtsk
þ c^tskðQ2Þ
 
 ½qtsk  qtsk 
XK
k¼1
q3kðdÞ  ½dk  dk P 0 8ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2K5; ð18Þ
where
K5  fðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ j ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2 RGMþSþGMSþTSKþKþ and (2), (5), (11), and (15) holdg.
Proof. We first prove that an equilibrium according to Definition 1 coincides with the solution of variational
inequality (18). Indeed, summation of (4), (14), and (17), after algebraic simplifications, yields (18).
We now prove the converse, that is, a solution to variational inequality (18) satisfies the sum of conditions
(4), (14), and (17), and is, therefore, an electric power supply chain network equilibrium pattern according to
Definition 1.
First, we add the term q1gms  q1gms to the first term in the third summand expression in (18). Then, we add
the term qt2sk  qt2sk to the first term in the fourth summand expression in (18). Since these terms are all equal
to zero, they do not change (18). Hence, we obtain the following inequality:
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
ofgmðqmÞ
oqgm
þ sgmegm
" #
 ½qgm  qgm þ
XS
s¼1
ocsðhÞ
ohs
 ½hs  hs  þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1

XS
s¼1
ocgmsðqgmsÞ
oqgms
þ oc^gmsðq

gmsÞ
oqgms
þ q1gms  q1gms
" #
 ½qgms  qgms þ
XS
s¼1
XK
k¼1

XT
t¼1
octskðqtskÞ
oqtsk
þ c^tskðqtskÞ þ qt2sk  qt2sk
 
 ½qtsk  qtsk 
XK
k¼1
q3kðdÞ  ½dk  dk P 0
8ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2K5; ð19Þ
which can be rewritten as
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
ofgmðqmÞ
oqgm
þ sgmegm
" #
 ½qgm  qgm þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
ocgmsðqgmsÞ
oqgms
 q1gms
" #
 ½qgms  qgms
þ
XS
s¼1
ocsðhÞ
ohs
 ½hs  hs  þ
XS
s¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
octskðqtskÞ
oqtsk
 qt2sk
 
 ½qtsk  qtsk þ
XS
s¼1
XM
m¼1
XG
g¼1
 oc^gmsðq

gmsÞ
oqgms
þ q1gms
" #
 ½qgms  qgms þ
XS
s¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
qt2sk þ c^tskðqtskÞ
 
 ½qtsk  qtsk 
XK
k¼1
q3kðdÞ  ½dk  dk P 0 8ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2K5. ð20Þ
Clearly, (20) is the sum of the optimality conditions (4) and (14), and the equilibrium conditions (20) and is,
hence, according to Definition 1 an electric power supply chain network equilibrium. h
We now describe how to recover the prices associated with the first and third tiers of nodes in the electric
power supply chain network. Clearly, the components of the vector q3 can be directly obtained from the solu-
tion to variational inequality (18). We now describe how to recover the prices q1gms, for all g, m, s, and q
t
2sk for
all s, k, t, from the solution of variational inequality (18). The prices associated with the power suppliers can be
obtained by setting ((16)) qt2sk ¼ q3k  c^tskðQ2Þ for any s, t, k such that qtsk > 0. The top-tiered prices, in turn,
can be recovered by setting ((4)) q1gms ¼ ofgmðq

mÞ
oqgms
þ sgmegm þ ocgmsðq

gmsÞ
oqgms
for any g, m, s such that qgms > 0.
Nagurney and Matsypura (2004) derived a variational inequality formulation of electric power supply
chain network equilibrium in the case of known demand functions but since the conservation of flow expres-
sion (7) in their model was an inequality the formulation also had Lagrange multipliers reflecting nodal prices
associated with those inequalities as variables in their variational inequality. Also, the models of Nagurney
and Matsypura (2004) and Nagurney and Liu (2005) did not include power plants and had no pollution
taxes for policy decision-making.
Note that the total carbon emissions generated by genco g can be obtained once variational inequality (18)
is solved. We denote the total amount of carbon emitted by genco g by TEg and we have that
TEg ¼
PM
m¼1egmq

gm. The total amount of carbon emitted by all the power generators, denoted by TE, is then:
TE ¼PGg¼1TEg ¼PGg¼1PMm¼1egmqgm.
Remark. For simplicity and definiteness, here we have considered the terms sgm, g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M,
to be pollution taxes, and, hence, their values are nonnegative. If one wishes to model a pollution credit for
production with a ‘‘clean’’ production technique (consider, for example, power production by wind farms)
then sgm would be a subsidy that takes on a negative value. The emission terms: egm, g = 1, . . . , G;
m = 1, . . . ,M, would no longer be used but, instead, mathematically, these terms would be set identically
equal to one to reflect the fact that a clean production subsidy must be attached to output instead of emissions.
All the above results would mathematically still hold true.
3. The transportation network equilibrium model with elastic demands
In this section, we recall the transportation network equilibrium model with elastic demands, due to Dafer-
mos (1982), in which the travel disutility functions are assumed known and given. In Section 4, we will then
establish that the electric power supply chain network model in Section 2 can be reformulated as such a trans-
portation network equilibrium problem but over a specially constructed network topology.
3.1. Transportation network equilibrium model
We consider a network G with the set of links L with K elements, the set of paths P with Q elements, and the
set of origin/destination (O/D) pairsW with Z elements. We denote the set of paths joining O/D pair w by Pw.
Links are denoted by a, b, etc; paths by p, q, etc., and O/D pairs by w1, w2, etc.
We denote the flow on path p by xp and the flow on link a by fa. The user travel cost on a link a is denoted
by ca and the user travel cost on a path p by Cp. We denote the travel demand associated with traveling
between O/D pair w by dw and the travel disutility by kw.
The link flows are related to the path flows through the following conservation of flow equations:
fa ¼
X
p2P
xpdap 8a 2 L; ð21Þ
where dap = 1 if link a is contained in path p, and dap = 0, otherwise. Hence, the flow on a link is equal to the
sum of the flows on paths that contain that link.
The user costs on paths are related to user costs on links through the following equations:
Cp ¼
X
a2L
cadap 8p 2 P ; ð22Þ
that is, the user cost on a path is equal to the sum of user costs on links that make up the path.
For the sake of generality, we allow the user cost on a link to depend upon the entire vector of link flows,
denoted by f, so that
ca ¼ caðf Þ 8a 2 L. ð23Þ
We have the following conservation of flow equations:X
p2Pw
xp ¼ dw 8w. ð24Þ
Also, assume, as given, disutility functions, such that
kw ¼ kwðdÞ 8w; ð25Þ
where d is the vector of travel demands with travel demand associated with O/D pair w being denoted by dw.
Definition 2 (Transportation network equilibrium). In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold for
each O/D pair w 2W and each path p 2 Pw:
CpðxÞ  kwðdÞ
¼ 0 if xp > 0;
P 0 if xp ¼ 0.
(
ð26Þ
The interpretation of conditions (26) is that only those paths connecting an O/D pair are used that have
minimal travel costs and those costs are equal to the travel disutility associated with traveling between that
O/D pair. As proved in Dafermos (1982), the transportation network equilibrium conditions (26) are equiv-
alent to the following variational inequality in path flows: determine ðx; dÞ 2K6 such thatX
w2W
X
p2Pw
CpðxÞ  ½xp  xp 
X
w2W
kwðdÞ  ½dw  dwP 0 8ðx; dÞ 2K6; ð27Þ
whereK6  fðx; dÞ j ðx; dÞ 2 RKþZþ and dw ¼
P
p2Pwxp; 8wg.
We now recall the equivalent variational inequality in link form due to Dafermos (1982).
Theorem 2. A link flow pattern and associated travel demand pattern is a transportation network equilibrium if
and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem: determine ðf ; dÞ 2K7 satisfyingX
a2L
caðf Þ  ðfa  f a Þ 
X
w2W
kwðdÞ  ðdw  dwÞP 0 8ðf ; dÞ 2K7; ð28Þ
where K7  fðf ; dÞ 2 RKþZþ j there exists an x satisfying (21) and dw ¼
P
p2Pwxp 8wg.
Beckmann et al. (1956) were the first to formulate rigorously the transportation network equilibrium con-
ditions (26) in the context of user link cost functions and travel disutility functions that admitted symmetric
Jacobian matrices so that the equilibrium conditions (26) coincided with the Kuhn–Tucker optimality condi-
tions of an appropriately constructed optimization problem. The variational inequality formulation, in turn,
allows for asymmetric functions.
4. Transportation network equilibrium reformulation of the electric power supply chain network
equilibrium model
In this section, we show that the electric power supply chain network equilibrium model presented in Sec-
tion 2 is isomorphic to a properly configured transportation network equilibrium model through the establish-
ment of a supernetwork equivalence of the former.
4.1. Supernetwork equivalence of the electric power supply chain network
We now establish the supernetwork equivalence of the electric power supply chain network equilibrium
model to the transportation network equilibrium model with known travel disutility functions described in
Section 3. This transformation allows us, as we will demonstrate in Section 5, to apply algorithms developed
for the latter class of problems to solve the former.
Consider an electric power supply chain network with power plants as discussed in Section 2 with given
power generators: g = 1, . . . , G; given power plants for each power generator: m = 1, . . . ,M; power suppliers:
s = 1, . . . , S; transmission service providers: t = 1, . . . , T, and demand markets: k = 1, . . . , K. The supernet-
work, GS, of the isomorphic transportation network equilibrium model is depicted in Fig. 2 and is constructed
as follows.
It consists of six tiers of nodes with the origin node 0 at the top or first tier and the destination nodes at the
sixth or bottom tier. Specifically, GS consists of a single origin node 0 at the first tier, and K destination nodes
at the bottom tier, denoted, respectively, by: z1, . . . , zK. There are K O/D pairs in GS denoted by w1 =
(0, z1), . . . , wk = (0, zk), . . . , wK = (0, zK). Node 0 is connected to each second tiered node xg, g = 1, . . . , G,
Fig. 2. The GS supernetwork representation of electric power network equilibrium.
by a single link. Each second tiered node xg, in turn, is connected to each third tiered node xgm, g = 1, . . . , G;
m = 1, . . . ,M, by a single link, and each third tiered node is then connected to each fourth-tiered node ys,
s = 1, . . . , S, by a single link. Each fourth tiered node ys is connected to the corresponding fifth tiered node
ys0 by a single link. Finally, each fifth tiered node ys0 is connected to each destination node zk, k = 1, . . . , K,
at the sixth tier by T parallel links.
Hence, in GS, there are G + GM + 2S + K + 1 nodes; G + GM + GMS + S + STK links, K O/D pairs, and
GMSTK paths. We now define the link and link flow notation. Let ag denote the link from node 0 to node xg
with associated link flow fag , for g = 1, . . . , G. Let agm denote the link from node xg to node xgm with link flow
fagm for g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M. Also, let agms denote the link from node xgm to node ys with associated
link flow fagms for g = 1, . . . , G, m = 1, . . . ,M, and s = 1, . . . , S. Let ass0 denote the link connecting node ys with
node ys0 with associated link flow fass0 for s; s
prime = 1, . . . , S. Finally, let ats0k denote the t-th link joining node
ys0 with node zk for s
0 = 1 0, . . . , S 0, t = 1, . . . , T, and k = 1, . . . , K and with associated link flow fat
s0k
.
We group the link flows into the vectors as follows: we group the ffagg into the vector f 1; the ffagmg into the
vector f 2, the ffagmsg into the vector f3; the ffass0 g into the vector f 4, and the ffats0kg into the vector f
5.
Thus, a typical path connecting O/D pair wk = (0, zk), is denoted by ptgmss0k and consists of five links:
ag; agm; agms; ass0 , and ats0k. The associated flow on the path is denoted by xptgmss0k . Finally, we let dwk be the demand
associated with O/D pair wk where kwk denotes the travel disutility for wk.
Note that the following conservation of flow equations must hold on the network GS:
fag ¼
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
XS0
s0¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
xpt
gmss0k
; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; ð29Þ
fagm ¼
XS
s¼1
XS0
s0¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
xpt
gmss0k
; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; ð30Þ
fagms ¼
XS0
s0¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
xpt
gmss0k
; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; ð31Þ
fass0 ¼
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
xpt
gmss0k
; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s0 ¼ 1; . . . ; S0; ð32Þ
fat
s0k
¼
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
xpt
gmss0k
; s0 ¼ 1; . . . ; S0; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T ; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K. ð33Þ
Also, we have that
dwk ¼
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
XS0
s0¼1
XT
t¼1
xpt
gmss0k
; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K. ð34Þ
If all path flows are nonnegative and (29)–(34) are satisfied, the feasible path flow pattern induces a feasible
link flow pattern.
We can construct a feasible link flow pattern for GS based on the corresponding feasible electric power sup-
ply chain flow pattern in the electric power supply chain network model, ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2K5, thus:
qg  fag ; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; ð35Þ
qgm  fagm ; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; ð36Þ
qgms  fagms ; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; ð37Þ
hs  fass0 ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s0 ¼ 10; . . . ; S0; ð38Þ
qtsk ¼ fats0k ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s
0 ¼ 10; . . . ; S0; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T ; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K; ð39Þ
dk ¼
XS
s¼1
XT
t¼1
qtsk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K. ð40Þ
Observe that although qg is not explicitly stated in the model in Section 2, it is inferred in that
qg ¼
XM
m¼1
qgm; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; ð41Þ
and simply represents the total electric power produced by genco g.
Note that if (q, Q1, h, Q2, d) is feasible then the link flow and demand pattern constructed according to
(35)–(40) is also feasible and the corresponding path flow pattern which induces this link flow (and demand)
pattern is also feasible.
We now assign user (travel) costs on the links of the network GS as follows: with each link ag we assign a
user cost cag defined by
cag  0; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; ð42Þ
cagm 
ofgm
oqgm
þ sgmegm; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; ð43Þ
with each link agms we assign a user cost cagms defined by
cagms 
ocgms
oqgms
þ oc^gms
oqgms
; g ¼ 1; . . . ;G; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; ð44Þ
with each link ss 0 we assign a user cost defined by
cass0 
ocs
ohs
; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s0 ¼ 1; . . . ; S0. ð45Þ
Finally, for each link ats0k we assign a user cost defined by
cat
s0k
 oc
t
sk
oqtsk
þ c^tsk; s ¼ 1; . . . ; S; s0 ¼ 1; . . . ; S0; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T ; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K. ð46Þ
Then a user of path ptgmss0k, for g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M; s = 1, . . . , S; s
0 = 1 0, . . . , S 0; t = 1, . . . , T;
k = 1, . . . , K, on network GS in Fig. 2 experiences a path travel cost Cpt
gmss0k
given by
Cpt
gmss0k
¼ cag þ cagm þ cagms þ cass0 þ cats0k ¼
ofgm
oqgm
þ sgmegm þ ocgmsoqgms
þ oc^gms
oqgms
þ ocs
ohs
þ oc
t
sk
oqtsk
þ c^tsk. ð47Þ
Also, we assign the (travel) demands associated with the O/D pairs as follows:
dwk  dk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K; ð48Þ
and the (travel) disutilities:
kwk  q3k; k ¼ 1; . . . ;K. ð49Þ
Consequently, the equilibrium conditions (26) for the transportation network equilibrium model on the net-
work GS state that for every O/D pair wk and every path connecting the O/D pair wk:
Cpt
gmss0k
 kwk ¼
ofgm
oqgm
þ sgmegm þ ocgmsoqgms
þ oc^gms
oqgms
þ ocs
ohs
þ oc
t
sk
oqtsk
þ c^tsk  kwk
¼ 0 if xpt
gmss0k
> 0;
P 0 if xpt
gmss0k
¼ 0.
8<
: ð50Þ
We now show that the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions (50) in link form as
in (28) is equivalent to the variational inequality (18) governing the electric power supply chain network equi-
librium. For the transportation network equilibrium problem on GS, according to Theorem 2, we have that a
link flow and travel disutility pattern ðf ; dÞ 2K7 is an equilibrium (according to (50)), if and only if it sat-
isfies the variational inequality:
XG
g¼1
cagðf 1Þ  ðfag  f agÞ þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
cagmðf 2Þ  ðfagm  f agmÞ þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
XS
s¼1
cagmsðf 3Þ  ðfagms  f agmsÞ
þ
XS
s¼1
XS0
s0¼1
cass0 ðf 4Þ  ðfass0  f ass0 Þ þ
XS0
s0¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
cat
s0k
ðf 5Þ  ðfat
s0k
 f at
s0k
Þ

XK
k¼1
kwk ðdÞ  ðdwk  dwk ÞP 0 8ðf ; dÞ 2K7. ð51Þ
After the substitution of (35)–(46) and (48)–(49) into (51), we have the following variational inequality: deter-
mine ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2K5 satisfying:
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1
ofgmðqmÞ
oqgm
þ sgmegm
" #
 ½qgm  qgm þ
XS
s¼1
ocsðhÞ
ohs
 ½hs  hs  þ
XG
g¼1
XM
m¼1

XS
s¼1
ocgmsðqgmsÞ
oqgms
þ oc^gmsðq

gmsÞ
oqgms
" #
 ½qgms  qgms þ
XS
s¼1
XK
k¼1
XT
t¼1
octskðqtskÞ
oqtsk
þ c^tskðQ2Þ
 
 ½qtsk  qtsk 
XK
k¼1
q3kðdÞ  ½dk  dk P 0 8ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2K5. ð52Þ
Variational inequality (52) is precisely variational inequality (18) governing the electric power supply chain
network equilibrium. Hence, we have the following result:
Theorem 3. A solution ðq; h;Q1;Q2; dÞ 2K5 of the variational inequality (18) governing the electric power
supply chain network equilibrium coincides with the (via (35)–(46) and (48)–(49) feasible link flow and travel
demand pattern for the supernetwork GS constructed above and satisfies variational inequality (51). Hence, it is a
transportation network equilibrium according to Theorem 2.
We now discuss the interpretation of the electric power supply chain network equilibrium conditions. These
conditions define the electric power supply network equilibrium in terms of paths and path flows, which, as
shown above, coincide with Wardrop’s (1952) first principle of user-optimization in the context of transpor-
tation networks over the network given in Fig. 2. Hence, we now have an entirely new interpretation of electric
power supply network equilibrium which states that only minimal cost paths will be used from the super
source node 0 to any destination node. Moreover, the cost on the utilized paths for a particular O/D pair
is equal to the disutility (or the demand market price) that the users are willing to pay. This interpretation also
implies a type of efficiency principle regarding electric power network operation and utilization, which was
first noted by Nagurney and Liu (2005) but in much simpler electric power supply chain network models with-
out power plants and pollution taxes.
In Section 5, we will show how Theorem 3 can be utilized to exploit algorithmically the theoretical results
obtained above when we compute the equilibrium patterns of numerical electric power supply chain network
examples using an algorithm previously used for the computation of elastic demand transportation network
equilibria. Of course, existence and uniqueness results obtained for elastic demand transportation net-
work equilibrium models as in Dafermos (1982) as well as stability and sensitivity analysis results (Nagurney
and Zhang, 1996) can now be transferred to electric power networks using the formalism/equivalence estab-
lished above.
It is important to emphasize that the connection formalized above between electric power supply chain
networks and transportation networks also unveils opportunities for further modeling enhancements. For
example, one may construct network representations of actual power grids and substitute these for the
corresponding transmission links in the supernetwork. The concept of equilibrium path flows would still be
appropriate and relevant but with the supernetwork expanded accordingly. For example, an analogous exten-
sion but in the case of spatial price network equilibrium problems can be found in Dafermos and Nagurney
(1984).
5. Computations
In this section, we provide numerical examples to demonstrate how the theoretical results in this paper
can be applied in practice. We utilize the Euler method for our numerical computations. The Euler method
is induced by the general iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and has been applied by Nagur-
ney and Zhang (1996) to solve variational inequality (27) in path flows (equivalently, variational inequality
(28) in link flows) (Zhang and Nagurney, 1997). Convergence results can be found in the above ref-
erences.
5.1. The Euler method
For the solution of (27), the Euler method takes the form: at iteration s compute the path flows for paths
p 2 P (and the travel demands) according to
xsþ1p ¼ maxf0; xsp þ asðkwðdsÞ  CpðxsÞÞg. ð53Þ
The simplicity of (53) lies in the explicit formula that allows for the computation of the path flows in closed
form at each iteration. The demands at each iteration simply satisfy (24) and this expression can be substituted
into the kw(Æ) functions.
The Euler method was implemented in FORTRAN and the computer system used was a Sun system at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The convergence criterion utilized was that the absolute value of the
path flows between two successive iterations differed by no more than 104. The sequence {as} in the Euler
method ((53)) was set to: 1; 1
2
; 1
2
; 1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
; . . .
 
. The Euler method was initialized by setting the demands equal
to 100 for each O/D pair with the path flows equally distributed.
In all the numerical examples, the electric power supply chain network consisted of two power generators,
with two power plants each, two power suppliers, one transmission provider, and two demand markets as
depicted in Fig. 3. The supernetwork representation which allows for the transformation (as proved in Section
4) to a transportation network equilibrium problem is given also in Fig. 3. Hence, in the numerical examples
(see also Fig. 2) we had that: G = 2, M = 2, S = 2, S 0 = 2 0, K = 2, and T = 1.
The notation is presented here and in the subsequent examples in the form of the electric power supply
chain network equilibrium model of Section 2. We then provide the translations of the equilibrium link flows,
and the travel demands (and disutilities) into the equilibrium electric power supply chain flows and prices.
Fig. 3. Electric power network and corresponding supernetwork GS for the numerical examples.
Example 1. The data for the first numerical example is given below. In order to construct a benchmark, we
assumed that none of the gencos’ power plants were polluting and that, hence, all the terms: egm, g = 1, 2;
m = 1, 2, were equal to zero. Hence, we did not impose any taxes.
The power generating cost functions for the power generators were given by
f11ðq1Þ ¼ 2:5q211 þ q11q21 þ 2q11; f 12ðq2Þ ¼ 2:5q212 þ q11q12 þ 2q22; f 21ðq1Þ ¼ .5q221 þ .5q11q21 þ 2q21;
f22ðq2Þ ¼ .5q222 þ q12q22 þ 2q22.
The transaction cost functions faced by the power generators and associated with transacting with the
power suppliers were given by
c111ðq111Þ ¼ .5q2111 þ 3:5q111; c112ðq112Þ ¼ .5q2112 þ 3:5q112; c121ðq121Þ ¼ .5q2121 þ 3:5q121;
c122ðq122Þ ¼ .5q2122 þ 3:5q122;
c211ðq211Þ ¼ .5q2211 þ 2q211; c212ðq212Þ ¼ .5q2212 þ 2q212; c221ðq221Þ ¼ .5q2221 þ 2q221;
c222ðq222Þ ¼ .5q2222 þ 2q222.
The operating costs of the power generators, in turn, were given by
c1ðQ1Þ ¼ .5
X2
i¼1
qi1
 !2
; c2ðQ1Þ ¼ .5
X2
i¼1
qi2
 !2
.
The demand market price functions at the demand markets were
q31ðdÞ ¼ 1:33d1 þ 366:6; q32 ¼ 1:33d2 þ 366:6;
and the transaction costs between the power suppliers and the consumers at the demand markets were given
by
c^1skðq1skÞ ¼ q1sk þ 5; s ¼ 1; 2; k ¼ 1; 2.
All other transaction costs were assumed to be equal to zero.
We utilized the supernetwork representation of this example depicted in Fig. 3 with the links enumerated as
in Fig. 3 in order to solve the problem via the Euler method. Note that there are 13 nodes and 20 links in the
supernetwork in Fig. 3. Using the procedure outlined in Section 4, we defined O/D pair w1 = (0, z1) and O/D
pair w2 = (0, z2) and we associated the O/D pair travel disutilities with the demand market price functions as
in (49) and the user link travel cost functions as given in (42)–(46) (analogous constructions were done for the
subsequent examples).
The Euler method converged in 67 iterations and yielded the equilibrium link flows (also the supernetwork
in Fig. 3):
f a1 ¼ 32:53; f a2 ¼ 115:22;
f a11 ¼ 22:57; f a12 ¼ 9:96; f a21 ¼ 22:90; f a22 ¼ 92:32;
f a110 ¼ f

a220
¼ 73:87;
f a111 ¼ 11:29; f a112 ¼ 11:29; f a121 ¼ 4:98; f a122 ¼ 4:98;
f a211 ¼ 11:45; f a212 ¼ 11:45; f a221 ¼ 46:16; f a222 ¼ 46:16;
f a1
101
¼ f a1
102
¼ f a1
201
¼ f a1
202
¼ 36:94;
and the following travel demands: dw1 ¼ 73:88; dw2 ¼ 73:88.
The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 268:36. We do not report the path flows due to space lim-
itations (there are eight paths connecting each O/D pair) but note that all paths connecting each O/D pair
were used, that is, had positive flow and the travel costs for paths connecting each O/D pair were equal to
the travel disutility for that O/D pair.
We now provide the translations of the above equilibrium flows into the electric power supply chain net-
work flow and price notation using (40)–(43) and (45)–(49).
The electric power supply chain network flows were
q1 ¼ 32:53; q2 ¼ 115:22;
q11 ¼ 22:57; q12 ¼ 9:96; q21 ¼ 22:90; q22 ¼ 9:96;
h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 73:87;
q111 ¼ 11:29; q112 ¼ 11:29; q121 ¼ 4:98; q122 ¼ 4:98;
q211 ¼ 11:45; q212 ¼ 11:45; q221 ¼ 46:16; q222 ¼ 46:16;
q1101 ¼ q1102 ¼ q1201 ¼ q1202 ¼ 36:94.
The demand prices at the demand markets were q31 = q32 = 268.36 and the demands were d

1 ¼ d2 ¼ 73:88.
The optimality/equilibrium conditions were satisfied with excellent accuracy.
Since we assumed that egm = 0, g = 1, 2; m = 1, 2, the total carbon emissions: TE = 0.
Example 2. We then solved a variant of Example 1. We kept the data identical to that in Example 1 except
that we considered power plant 1 of genco 1 to be polluting with e11 = 1. Our goal was to identify a tax high
enough so that the polluting power plant would not produce at all, which means that the corresponding
equilibrium link flow would be zero. By setting s11 = 133 (determined through simulations) we obtained that
f a11 ¼ 0, which means that this pollution tax was sufficiently high enough that the genco did not use the
polluting plant at all.
The Euler method converged in 65 iterations and yielded the following equilibrium link flows (Fig. 3):
f a1 ¼ 10:77; f a2 ¼ 128:71;
f a11 ¼ 0:00; f a12 ¼ 10:77; f a21 ¼ 29:14; f a22 ¼ 99:58;
f a110 ¼ f

a220
¼ 69:74;
f a111 ¼ 0:00; f a112 ¼ 0:00; f a121 ¼ 5:38; f a122 ¼ 5:38;
f a211 ¼ 14:57; f a212 ¼ 14:57; f a221 ¼ 49:79; f a222 ¼ 49:79;
f a1
101
¼ f a1
102
¼ f a1
201
¼ f a1
202
¼ 34:87;
and the following travel demands: dw1 ¼ dw2 ¼ 69:74.
The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 273:85 and the equilibrium demands were
dw1 ¼ dw2 ¼ 69:74.
Although we do not report the equilibrium path flows, due to space constraints, we note that, in this exam-
ple, two paths connecting each O/D pair were not used; in other words, they had flows of zero on them.
For completeness, we provide the translations of the above equilibrium flows into the electric power supply
chain network flow and price notation using (40)–(43) and (45)–(49).
The electric power supply chain network flows were
q1 ¼ 10:77; q2 ¼ 128:71;
q11 ¼ 0:00; q12 ¼ 10:77; q21 ¼ 29:14; q22 ¼ 99:58;
h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 69:74;
q111 ¼ 0:00; q112 ¼ 0:00; q121 ¼ 5:38; q122 ¼ 5:38;
q211 ¼ 11:45; q212 ¼ 14:57; q221 ¼ 49:79; q222 ¼ 49:79;
q1101 ¼ q1102 ¼ q1201 ¼ q1202 ¼ 34:87.
The demand prices at the demand markets were q31 = q32 = 273.85 and the demands were d

1 ¼ d2 ¼ 69:74.
Note that, with the imposition of the pollution tax, the demand for electric power was reduced and the price
of electric power increased.
The total emissions generated were due to the first power plant of the first genco with TE1 ¼ e11q11 ¼ 0. We
note that if no carbon tax had been imposed then TE1 = 22.57, and the demand would have been equal to
73.88 and the demand market price to 268.36 at each of the two demand markets.
Example 3. Example 3 was constructed from Example 2. The data were identical to the data in Example 2,
except that we now assumed that the first power plant of genco 2 was also polluting with e21 = 1. We imposed
the same tax on the first power plant of the second genco as we had for power plant 1 of genco 1. Hence, in this
example, all taxes were equal to zero except that s11 = s21 = 133.
The Euler method converged in 67 iterations and yielded the following new equilibrium pattern: The com-
puted equilibrium link flows were now:
f a1 ¼ 17:42; f a2 ¼ 113:36;
f a11 ¼ 5:80; f a12 ¼ 11:61; f a21 ¼ 6:14; f a22 ¼ 107:22;
f a110 ¼ f

a220
¼ 65:39;
f a111 ¼ 2:90; f a112 ¼ 2:90; f a121 ¼ 5:81; f a122 ¼ 5:81;
f a211 ¼ 3:07; f a212 ¼ 3:07; f a221 ¼ 53:61; f a222 ¼ 53:61;
f a1
101
¼ f a1
102
¼ f a1
201
¼ f a1
202
¼ 32:69;
and the following travel demands: dw1 ¼ dw2 ¼ 65:39. The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 279:63.
In this example (as in Example 1), all paths connecting each O/D pair were used, that is, they had positive
equilibrium flows.
The electric power supply chain network flows/transactions were
q1 ¼ 17:42; q2 ¼ 113:36;
q11 ¼ 5:80; q12 ¼ 11:61; q21 ¼ 6:14; q22 ¼ 107:22;
h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 65:39;
q111 ¼ 2:90; q112 ¼ 2:90; q121 ¼ 5:81; q122 ¼ 5:81;
q211 ¼ 3:07; q212 ¼ 3:07; q221 ¼ 53:61; q222 ¼ 53:61;
q1101 ¼ q1102 ¼ q1201 ¼ q1202 ¼ 32:69.
The demand prices at the demand markets were q31 = q32 = 279.63, with demands of d

1 ¼ d2 ¼ 65:39.
The imposition of the same tax on the polluting power plants of both power generators had the effect that
both these power plants produced electric power. In Example 2, in contrast, the imposition of a single tax
resulted in no production at the polluting power plant, whereas keeping that tax and imposing the same
tax also on another power plant resulted in production in the former plant. However, the polluting power
plant of genco 2 did reduce its production substantially in plant 1 as compared to what it produced there
in Example 2. The demand market prices at the two demand markets were now higher than in Example 2
and the demand for electric power was lower in both demand markets (due to the higher prices as a conse-
quence of the pollution taxes). The total pollution generated was: TE = TE1 + TE2 = 5.80 + 6.14 = 11.94.
Notice that the total amount of carbon emitted, relative to the amount emitted in Example 2, was essentially
reduced by 50%.
Example 4. In Example 4, we then set out to ask the question, what would be the effects of imposing the same
tax on all the genco/power plants, assuming that egm = 1 for g = 1,2; m = 1,2. In this example, we set
sgm = 133 for g = 1,2 and m = 1,2.
The Euler method converged in 65 iterations. The computed equilibrium link flows were now:
f a1 ¼ 20:24; f a2 ¼ 72:50;
f a11 ¼ 14:09; f a12 ¼ 6:15; f a21 ¼ 14:42; f a22 ¼ 58:05;
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f a110 ¼ f

a220
¼ 46:37;
f a111 ¼ 7:04; f a112 ¼ 7:04; f a121 ¼ 3:08; f a122 ¼ 3:08;
f a211 ¼ 7:21; f a212 ¼ 7:21; f a221 ¼ 29:04; f a222 ¼ 29:04;
f a1
101
¼ f a1
102
¼ f a1
201
¼ f a1
202
¼ 23:18;
and the following travel demands:
dw1 ¼ dw2 ¼ 46:37.
The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 304:93.
In this example, all paths (as in Examples 1 and 3) were used in equilibrium, that is, they had positive flows.
The electric power supply chain network flows/transactions were
q1 ¼ 20:24; q2 ¼ 72:50;
q11 ¼ 14:09; q12 ¼ 6:15; q21 ¼ 14:42; q22 ¼ 58:05;
h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 46:37;
q111 ¼ 7:04; q112 ¼ 7:04; q121 ¼ 3:08; q122 ¼ 3:08;
q211 ¼ 7:21; q212 ¼ 7:21; q221 ¼ 29:04; q222 ¼ 29:04;
q1101 ¼ q1102 ¼ q1201 ¼ q1202 ¼ 23:18.
The demand prices at the demand markets were
q31 ¼ q32 ¼ 304:93;
and the demands for electric power were now: d1 ¼ d2 ¼ 46:37.
The imposition of a pollution tax on all the power plants results in a substantial increase in demand market
prices and a decrease in demand for electric power.
The total amount of emissions: TE = TE1 + TE2 = 92.71, where TE1 = 14.09 + 6.15 = 20.24 and
TE2 = 14.42 + 58.05 = 72.47. If we had not imposed the taxes, the total amount of emissions would have been
147.23 and the demand would have been 73.88 and the demand market price would have been equal to 268.36
at each demand market.
Example 5. In Example 5, our goal was to identify how high the taxes should be on the first (assumed to be
polluting) power plants of each generator so that neither high-polluting power plant would be used. In
Example 3, if we imposed taxes: s11 = s21 = 133, then the first power plant of each genco was still producing.
We, hence, conducted the following simulation: we increased the taxes from 133 for both those power plants
(thus, we used as the baseline Example 3) until we achieved zero production at those power plants. Taxes of
s11 = s21 = 188 yielded the desired policy result that there was zero production at the noxious power plants.
The complete equilibrium solution is now reported. The Euler method converged in 62 iterations and
yielded the following equilibrium solution: The computed equilibrium link flows were now:
f a1 ¼ 12:20; f a2 ¼ 112:53;
f a11 ¼ 0:00; f a12 ¼ 12:20; f a21 ¼ 0:00; f a22 ¼ 112:53;
f a110 ¼ f

a220
¼ 62:37;
f a111 ¼ 0:00; f a112 ¼ 0:00; f a121 ¼ 6:10; f a122 ¼ 6:10;
f a211 ¼ 0:00; f a212 ¼ 0:00; f a221 ¼ 56:26; f a222 ¼ 56:26;
f a1
101
¼ f a1
102
¼ f a1
201
¼ f a1
202
¼ 31:18;
and the following travel demands:
dw1 ¼ dw2 ¼ 62:37.
The incurred travel disutilities were kw1 ¼ kw2 ¼ 283:60.
In this example, four paths (that is, half of the paths) connecting each O/D pair had zero flow in equilib-
rium (and, hence, were not used) and this is because their path travel costs exceeded the equilibrium path costs
of the used paths (and the travel disutilities for the respective O/D pair).
The electric power flows/transactions were
q1 ¼ 12:20; q2 ¼ 112:53;
q11 ¼ 0:00; q12 ¼ 12:20; q21 ¼ 0:00; q22 ¼ 112:53;
h1 ¼ h2 ¼ 62:37;
q111 ¼ 0:00; q112 ¼ 0:00; q121 ¼ 6:10; q122 ¼ 6:10;
q211 ¼ 0:00; q212 ¼ 0:00; q221 ¼ 56:26; q222 ¼ 56:26;
q1101 ¼ q1102 ¼ q1201 ¼ q1202 ¼ 31:18.
The demand prices at the demand markets were q31 = q32 = 283.60, with demands of d

1 ¼ d2 ¼ 62:37.
The numerical examples illustrate some of the types of simulations that can be conducted in order to inves-
tigate the ramification of the imposition of pollution taxes.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new model of electric power supply chain networks with distinct power plants,
which allows for distinct fuels. The model also includes carbon pollution taxes that can be imposed on the
various power generator/power plant combinations. We derived the optimality conditions of the decision-
makers and proved that the governing equilibrium conditions satisfy a variational inequality problem. We
then demonstrated that the electric power supply chain network equilibrium problem can be reformulated
as a transportation network equilibrium problem with elastic demands over an appropriately constructed
abstract network or supernetwork (see also Boyce et al. (2005)).
Specifically, we utilized variational inequality theory to establish the equivalence between the electric power
supply chain network equilibrium problem in which there are multiple power plants associated with each
power generator (or genco) with assigned pollution taxes and a transportation network equilibrium problem
with elastic demands over a specially-constructed supernetwork. The theoretical results established in this
paper were then exploited in the computation of electric power supply chain numerical examples with distinct
pollution taxes which were solved as reformulated transportation network equilibrium problems. The numer-
ical examples illustrate the flexibility of assigning taxes in achieving such desired outcomes as zero production
in the highest polluting power plants. This paper further confirms a hypothesis of Beckmann et al. (1956) that
electric power generation and distribution networks are related to transportation network equilibrium prob-
lems; see also McGuire (1997, 1999). For the analogous equivalence, but for multitiered supply chain network
problems, see Nagurney (in press).
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